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Abstract
In this paper some studies with respect to empirical socio-economic research which has been under-
taken in Belgium and the Netherlands concerning the functioning of legal rules and institutions are
discussed. The paper focuses on the domains of criminal law, civil procedure, liability and insurance.
The paper argues that contrary to the overwhelming economic literature on liability and insurance, the
empirical results in that domain are poor. More research is undertaken in the area of criminal law and
apparently it is overwhelming in the area of civil procedure. The latter studies are, however, mainly
undertaken by socio-legal scholars and less by economists. The general conclusion of the empirical
studies discussed seems to be that while the empirical literature on the effect of changes in the decision
making environment on rational actions in the legal system is rich and provocative, there is much less
empirical testing of the effects of legal rules as such on allocational outcomes. The paper argues that
much more effort should be devoted to the latter issue.
Keywords: Empirical research, criminal law, deterrence, cost-benefit analysis, selection of cases for
trial, economics of the court system, self-regulation of attorneys, efficiency of liability rules, insurance
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I. Introduction1
The aim of this paper is to provide a selection of research results concerning the
functioning of legal rules and institutions in Belgium and the Netherlands. A
selection will be made of papers which have been presented and published either
in Dutch or French in Belgium or in the Netherlands or papers on Belgian or
Dutch legal rules. One of the goals of this selection of empirical research is to
analyze whether some of the claims of the economic analysis of law, that the law
aims at an efficient allocation of resources, can be backed up by empirical
research. This is undoubtedly in the interest of law and economics scholars in
Europe generally since lawyers have often turned down economic analysis as a
research method, claiming that economic methodology would not be a useful tool
to analyze legal rules. Moreover, if the findings would be that empirical research is
to a large extent lacking or lacking with respect to specific domains, this might
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provide useful insights for the future research agenda for European law and
economics scholars and especially for those scholars in Belgium and the Nether-
lands. Providing an overview of empirical research is, however, certainly not only
useful for law and economics scholars interested in empirical justifications of their
theories. One of the strengths of law and economics is undoubtedly that it has
stressed the need to examine whether legal rules are able to fulfill the goals which
they are said to serve. These types of effectiveness studies addressing e.g. unpre-
dicted effects of regulation are interesting for a much wider audience as well.
Obviously the effects of legal rules have been analyzed as well in other disci-
plines, such as sociology of law. Some of this research in which empirical informa-
tion is provided on the functioning of legal rules and institutions will be discussed
as well.2 This paper does, however, not provide an overview or summary of all
possible studies in that respect, but merely a selection which undoubtedly will
reflect some personal preferences for specific topics. Hence, the reader should not
expect a Benelux version of the book of Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock in which they
provide an overview of theoretical and empirical insights with respect to the
domain of accident law.3 I will merely try to show how some BelgianrDutch
research has provided interesting tests of the hypotheses of the economic analysis
of law. In addition some research will be discussed as well which does not address
the allocational effects of legal rules themselves, but which examines the environ-
Ž .mental circumstances under which these rules are or are not applied to specific
cases. Many papers indeed focus on the effects of changes in the decision-making
environment on the rational decisions of various actors in the legal system.
From the outset it should be made clear that since the economic analysis of law
is still a relatively young discipline in the Benelux, the number of scholars available
to do empirical research is limited. The first best option of having econometric
analysis with regressions, showing the precise effects of e.g. changes in specific
Žlegal rules is almost totally lacking with some exceptions as far as the domain of
.criminal law is concerned . There is some quantitative material in the sense that
statistical data are provided on certain evolutions which are brought in relationship
with e.g. changes in legal regimes. When even that statistical material is lacking I
will present some qualitative information which BelgianrDutch law and economics
scholars have provided in an attempt to show that the judges or legislators in
Belgium or the Netherlands followed the predictions from the economic analysis of
law. This can e.g. take the form of cases in which an economic reasoning can be
found. Obviously this is different from what is traditionally concerned empirical
work in the social sciences. Moreover, this paper only allows to provide an overview
of the studies which have been undertaken and the most important research
results, but it is in most cases not possible to discuss the research methodology
used.
Four domains of the legal system have been chosen for this selective overview:
Ž .first the traditional domain of criminal law will be addressed II ; then a few
Ž .examples from research with respect to procedural law will be presented III .
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Ž .Finally I will turn to the domain of liability and insurance IV and a few
Ž .concluding observations will be formulated V .
II. Criminial law
A. Introduction
An area where one would expect that there would be a sufficient amount of
empirical work available is undoubtedly the domain of crime and punishment. This
is an area which has received lots of attention both in economic literature and in
many sociological studies. Following the pioneering work of Becker 4 and Stigler 5
economists have especially been interested in the questions how potential criminals
could be deterred through an appropriate combination of detection and an
expected punishment and what the optimal allocation of resources to crime control
should be.6 Sociologists on the other hand have tried to examine}among
others}the determinants of criminal behaviour and have thus been concerned
with the question what influences the probability that someone would become
either a criminal or a victim.7
The Netherlands and Belgium have a rich criminological tradition which resulted
in various studies concerning the causes of crime. It is obviously not possible to
provide an overview of those studies here; moreover this would not be relevant
either since many of these studies are not concerned with the crucial question in
this paper, being whether there is empirical proof that a change in the legal
environment influences the behaviour of people.8 Therefore we shall focus on a
few studies which address on the one hand Becker’s hypothesis that potential
criminals would react to changes in either the probability of detection or the
Ž .expected sanction the reasoning criminal hypothesis and on the other hand
studies which are concerned with Stigler’s hypothesis concerning the government’s
Ž . 9allocation of resources to crime control the reasoning government hypothesis .
B. The deterrence hypothesis
Some studies in Belgium and the Netherlands have addressed the question whether
the hypothesis that potential criminals can be deterred through the expectation of
being detected and imposed a sanction can be supported empirically. A nice
Ž .overview though without BelgianrDutch empirical data on the ‘‘state of the art’’
in deterrence studies is provided by Moerland and Rodermond.10 The same
authors have in a subsequent study provided an overview of studies which have
empirically tested the hypothesis that shoplifters would be guided by a weighing of
costs and benefits of the criminal behaviour in their decision to commit crime.
They provide an overview of a number of North American studies who have tested
this deterrence hypothesis and conclude that there is very little empirical support
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for the hypothesis that the shoplifters’ decision to commit crime would be influ-
enced by his expectations concerning the legal reaction.11 The importance of this
study should obviously not be overstated since it merely provides a summary of
other empirical research; it is therefore less clear on which methodology the
scholars base their conclusions. A similar pessimistic approach concerning the
deterrent effect of crime control can, strikingly, be found in a study by Van Dijk,
director of the Netherlands Research Centre of the Ministry of Justice.12 Van Dijk
claims, again referring to other studies,13 that neither the number of policemen,
nor the severity of sanctions has a significant effect on the rate for the most
Ž .common crimes. These pessimistic findings therefore hold that professional
criminals could hardly be deterred from committing crime. The question obviously
arises why society should spend additional resources on the criminal justice system,
if deterrence doesn’t work, as Van Dijk claims. His answer is that public expendi-
tures on crime control are justified to satisfy the public demand for law and
order.14
A different picture is, however, presented in several studies of Van Tulder, a
Dutch economist who spent considerable research efforts on the determinants of
crime. In a 1985 book Van Tulder provides an overview of the Dutch and
American empirical studies addressing the determinants of crime.15 Most of these
studies which Van Tulder discusses concern criminological studies identifying the
determinants of crime such as age, gender, level of education, but spent little
attention to the effects of law in deterring crime. Van Tulder, however, also
presents the results of a study which he conducted, which has examined the
influence of the detection rate as well as the probability of conviction on crime. He
found that increasing the detection rate does indeed have a negative effect on
crime rate: if hypothetically a large city would raise the detection rate of crime with
1% this would lead}ceteris paribus}to 0,5% reduction in the registered criminal-
ity. The deterrent effect of the conviction rate seemed to be lower than the
detection rate.16 A similar result was found by Van Tulder concerning the percent-
age of prison sanctions related to the total number of convictions: this equally
leads to a reduction of the crime rate. Van Tulder, however, notes that this may be
due to deterrence, but that it is equally possible that the crime rate is simply
reduced in case of increased prison sanctions by the fact that the incarcerated
Žcriminals are temporarily unable to engage in the criminal activity the so-called
.incapacitation effect . Although Van Tulder therefore concludes that there are
significant effects of detection rates and criminal convictions on crime, he equally
Žrecognises that other criminogenic determinants such as demographic, social and
.economic factors are apparently far more important than the influence of the
criminal justice system on crime rates.17
If one looks at the various studies which examined the effects of criminal justice
system on crime rate in the Netherlands, there generally seem to be differences
between the types of crimes. Van Dijk e.g. reports that burglars will not be
deterred as a result of the risk of punishment.18 There seems to be one category
Žwhere the effects of the criminal justice system either through raising the detec-
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.tion rate or the expected punishment seems, however, to be more significant. This
concerns the area of traffic violations. Van Tulder indeed reports that there is a
relationship between the number of convictions and the crime rate as far as drunk
driving is concerned19 and even the authors who generally caused doubts upon the
deterrent effect of the criminal justice system admit that increased police efforts
might reduce the number of traffic violations.20 Mattie and Kraay argue that with
respect to speed limit violations drivers actually weigh the benefits of violation
Ž . Žusually in time versus the costs the expected punishment, but also the reduced
. 21safety . Other studies related to the area of traffic confirm this pattern: on the
highway between Utrecht and Amsterdam large signs made the drivers aware of
the fact that the speed limit of 100 kmrh would be enforced systematically: this led
to a reduction of the number of speed limit violations from 28% to about 10% and
to a reduction of the number of traffic accidents with personal injury of 50%.22
Finally it is interesting to point at a criminological study by Hauber who examined
the influence of increased control on the public transportation system in the
Ž . 23Netherlands on the ‘‘crime’’ rate using the transportation system without paying .
Hauber equally found that awareness of the public at large of the increased
probability of detection had a significant influence on the reduction of violations.
There has been a strong belief in crime policy in the Netherlands that increasing
the time within which the sanction is imposed after the crime would increase
specific deterrence. This hypothesis has been empirically investigated by Bosker,
but his investigation showed that this time issue had in fact no statistically
significant influence on deterrence.24 Speedy criminal procedures and imposition
of sanction may, however, still be useful from a rule of law perspective.25
C. Costs of crime
If we now turn to the other question, being whether the BelgianrDutch crime
control authorities allocate their resources taken into account the costs of crime,
we can first point at several studies who try to establish developments in crime
rates.26
Several scholars argue that a good knowledge of crime rates is indispensable for
an adequate crime control policy.27 This approach is, however, criticized by some
criminologists who argue that it is wrong to base the allocation of resources for
crime control merely on statistical information concerning crime rates.28
In the Netherlands Van Dijk has often pointed at the social costs of crime,
basically to argue that more resources should be devoted to crime control. Van
Dijk argued that the average costs of crime in the Netherlands amounted to
3,5]4,0 billion Dutch guilders in 1983.29 He argued that, taking into account these
costs, the available budget for crime control of about 2 billion Dutch guilders a
year would be much too low.30 Van Dijk and Roell have conducted a similar study¨
Ž .several years later in 1988 and have once more determined the total costs of
crime.31 In this new study they argued that the Dutch society suffers a damage of
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23,6 to 28,6 billion Dutch guilders as a result of crime. These studies all have the
Ž .same policy goal: they want to convince governments to spend more efforts on
crime control. The least one can say from an economic point of view is that
apparently Dutch researchers try to estimate the total costs of crime as a basis for
crime control policy.
D. Costrbenefit analysis of crime control policies
A next question is obviously whether research is also done with respect to the
effectiveness of various options of crime control. In this respect we can once more
refer to various studies of Van Tulder. Van Tulder has, first of all, examined two
policy options to control crime: either raising the detection rate or the expected
punishment.32 The BeckerrStigler models have indicated that both options can
lead to increased deterrence, but that there are obviously cost differences: increas-
ing the detection rate is, of course, more costly than increasing the sanction
Ž .especially if a monetary sanction is concerned . Van Tulder was interested in the
question whether either raising the detection rate or the number of convictions
would have a better deterrent effect.33 Van Tulder found that raising the detection
rate has a relatively better deterrent effect than raising the conviction rate. In his
dissertation Van Tulder found a positive effect of more and longer prison sanctions
on crime rate.34 This effect was, however, mostly achieved as a result of the
incapacitation effect of imprisonment. Recently Van Tulder en Van der Torre have
also developed a model to determine the relationship between crime rate and the
necessary prison capacity in the Netherlands.35
Obviously criminologists have also addressed the practical working of the crimi-
nal justice system, e.g. by focusing on the question what determines whether a case
will actually be prosecuted before the court.36 These studies can, however, not be
discussed within the scope of this paper.
E. Results
How do the BelgianrDutch empirical results relate to the basic theoretical
hypothesis? Obviously the basic BeckerrStigler hypothesis have been very much
refined during the past thirty years, but nevertheless their papers still constitute a
starting point for the economic analysis of crime. The empirical material discussed
from Belgium and the Netherlands provides some support for the theory that
potential criminals may alter their behaviour under the threat of an expected
sanction. However, the evidence seems to go in various directions. Van Dijk
presents a rather pessimistic finding, indicating that ‘‘professional’’ criminals could
hardly be deterred through an expected sanction. More refined studies by Van
Tulder, however, provide some proof of a deterrent effect of the expected sanction.
Moreover, Van Tulder also proved that raising the detection rate or the number of
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convictions has a better effect on deterrence than merely raising the expected
sanction. This corresponds with predictions in the theoretical literature e.g. by
Easterbrook who had equally indicated that potential criminals might better react
to raising the detection rate37 and with earlier empirical studies by Ehrlich who
equally found that raising the probability of detection has a more significant
38 Ždeterrent effect than raising the expected sanction. This deterrent effect of an
.increased detection rate seems even to be stronger in case of regulatory violations
Ž .such as traffic violations .
Although the empirical research presented provides therefore some support for
the hypothesis that the aggregate level of crime may be influenced by raising the
detection rate, a lot of other aspects on the theories of crime have not been tested
yet. This is e.g. the case for the trade off between fines and prison sanctions. An
interesting aspect in that respect is obviously the question whether social policy in
Ž .Belgium and the Netherlands is indeed focused on an optimal use of the cheap
Ž . 39fines to be able to avoid the costly prison sanction. Interestingly, the Dutch
policy maker apparently uses data on the costs of crime to support further
expenditures on crime control. This provides some support for Stigler’s hypothesis
that governments will determine the ‘‘optimal level of crime’’ by weighing crime
control costs versus the damage caused by crime. These studies, however, do not
provide proof that e.g. Dutch policies on how to spend the public budget concern-
ing crime control would be cost efficient. In sum, the empirical findings provide
some confirmation, all be it modest, of the hypothesis formulated in the theoretical
literature on crime.
III. Civil procedure
A. Introduction
In the discussion on liability and insurance we will indicate that the literature is
Ž .strongly influenced by economists and that the interest of Belgian or Dutch
sociologists in that topic seems of a more recent date.40 The contrary seems to be
true for the domain of civil procedure. Although there are obviously many
Žtheoretical papers on civil procedure although most of them written outside
.Belgium or the Netherlands , there is a vast literature of Belgian and Dutch
sociologists concerning the working of the civil procedure system. Precisely because
this has received that much attention in the socio-legal literature, the domain of
civil procedure cannot be neglected in a paper discussing empirical research with
respect to the effectiveness of legal rules and institutions. However, precisely
because there are that many papers dealing with this topic only a selection of the
various studies can be presented here. For the remainder we can refer to several
overviews on the state of socio-legal research in the Netherlands41 and in Belgium,42
which equally provide summaries of empirical studies.
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B. Litigation rates and selection of cases for trial
Many studies in the Low Countries have been devoted to the question what kind of
issues may generally explain litigation rates. These kind of studies are concerned
with the more general question whether increased litigation is due to e.g. socio-
economic determinants or to the e.g. changes of the civil procedure. Other studies
are devoted to the well-known question what influences in one particular case the
decision of parties to bring a lawsuit or to settle.
1. Selection of cases for trial. Starting with this last topic, the selection of cases for
trial, also in the Benelux scholars have been interested to test the PriestrKlein
hypothesis on the selection of cases.43 Their claim is, roughly summarised, that on
the basis of rational estimates of the likely decision only these cases where the
chance of a plaintiff victory is 50% will go to trial; otherwise parties would settle.
An interesting study in that respect has been undertaken by Van Koppen, Richters
and Ten Cate in 1989 for the Dutch Ministry of Justice.44 Using psychological field
Žstudies they examine whether indeed it would only be the 50-50 cases in other
.words the cases in which there is doubt that would end up in a trial. They have
Ž .used various empirical tests experiments and interviews with attorneys. The
working hypothesis is that during negotiations with respect to a settlement it is not
that much the objective chance of winning during a trial which will determine the
willingness of a party to settle, but his subjective perception of that chance. This
was confirmed in their empirical research: when the attorney of one of the parties
is largely overestimating the chances during trial, this may inhibit the negotiations
to result in a settlement.45 This study claims that parties who expect only a minor
profit during the trial are not enough willing to settle, whereas parties who expect
to win during the trial tend to give in too easily during the negotiations. They
therefore argue that the weaker party during the negotiations might take too many
risks and will often prefer the chance of a trial. According to them it is therefore,
contrary to the PriestrKlein hypothesis, not necessarily the 50-50 cases which will
wind up in trial.46 Once a settlement is reached the study concluded that the
amount for which is settled will be deter mined by the chances of winning during
trial and the possibilities to execute a judgement. This finding seems to be
consistent with economic theory.47
ŽThe question whether a creditor will bring a lawsuit or settle usually for a lower
.amount has been examined empirically as well in a Dutch doctoral thesis on debt
collection procedures in 1996 by Freudenthal.48 Freudenthal found that 85% of all
Ž .civil and commercial cases excluding family matters before the Dutch district
Ž . Ž .courts Rechtbanken and lower courts Kantongerechten consist of money debt
collection. Creditors usually have the choice between extra-judicial means of debt
collection and the regular judicial procedures for money claims.49 Freudenthal
found that creditors}obviously}balanced costs and benefits and then decide the
means of collection they will take. Only in 50% of cases in which extra-judicial
collection was unsuccessful, a creditor will bring a case to court. Usually the
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Ž .proceedings are brought before the lower court Kantongerecht , since in that case
the debt collection agency can represent the creditor. Proceedings before the
district court require compulsory representation by an attorney at law, which raises
costs. Of all debts handed over for extra-judicial collection, 60]80% are paid, 50%
of the 20]40% left are brought to court; the remainder is considered uncollectible.50
Freudenthal found that creditors in choosing between the extra-judicial and the
judicial debt collection make a well-informed choice based on the costs and
benefits. Moreover, if the judicial debt collection is chosen, the creditor will choose
the court where he can get a decision within a short time after entry of the claim.51
The Amsterdam judicial collection procedures would, according to Freudenthal,
provide the best results in that respect.52
Obviously this whole issue of judicial versus non-judicial debt collection has
received a lot of attention from lawyers who have formulated several proposals to
increase the quality and effectiveness of the judicial procedures.53
2. Litigation rates. Several studies have tried to calculate an evolution in the
number of cases.54 Some other studies have also tried to identify what kind of
determinants influence the litigation rate. Langerwerf looked at various variables
Žwhich could determine the litigation rate. One of them was economic gross
. Žproduction, import and export ; another was social employment rate, quantity of
. 55the working force and a third one was the number of attorneys. His finding was
that the social and economic factors most strongly influence the litigation rate but
that there is no correlation at all with the number of lawyers in society. The issue
of the litigation rate was briefly discussed in the Netherlands as well, referring to
Ž .the question how many cases go to the Dutch Supreme Court Hoge Raad . One of
the members of the Supreme Court had been arguing that there would be a too
heavy workload for the Dutch Supreme Court given the increased number of
requests for review. Bruinsma, however, reacted that this increase merely corre-
sponded with a general increase in the litigation rate in the Netherlands: when the
number of cases at trial courts increases it should not be surprising that also the
number of cases with the Dutch Supreme Court increases, so he argued.56
The differences between litigation rates in various countries have also been
examined by Blankenburg en Verwoerd.57 They are interested in the question why
for instance in the Netherlands there would be a higher number of out of court
settlements than in Germany. They argue that this is partially caused through
supply determinants such as costs, the time in which a case can be handled and the
available alternatives. The possibilities for extra-judicial settlements would be
larger in the Netherlands than in Germany, so they argue. Based on an analysis of
labour conflicts, sale of goods, leases and traffic accidents they argue that only a
small proportion of the legal conflicts actually reaches the courts. One of their
conclusions is that the fact that Dutch citizens would make less use of formal
judicial procedures than German citizens could be attributed to the fact that the
Dutch government has made available an elaborate system of legal aid and
alternatives for judicial procedures. This would have a large ‘‘filtering effect’’ with
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respect to the cases that actually go to trial.58 They therefore hold that the
investments of the Dutch government in legal aid as well as in extra-judicial
conflict mechanisms have well higher paid off in the sense that there are appar-
ently less court cases in the Netherlands than in Germany.59 This claim, that the
civil litigation rate is considerably higher in Germany than in the Netherlands has
equally been made in the doctoral dissertation of Verwoerd.60 The same conclu-
sion was reached by Sisma with respect to the settlement of traffic accidents.61
C. Economics of the legal aid and court system
There have been some studies by Dutch economists which on the one hand
examine the price elasticity of the demand for legal aid and on the other hand
Ž .examine whether the production of the court system in terms of judgements can
be increased by raising the resources available for the court system. Both issues
have been addressed by Van Tulder.62 Van Tulder and Jansen first of all examined
the effects of the Dutch legal aid system and more particularly the question
whether a contribution by the client in the legal aid system would reduce the
63 Ždemand for services. They examined the effects both of price increases of the
. Ž .services of lawyers and income effects referring to the income of the client . They
found that a 1% price increase in attorneys’ fees gave rise to a reduction in the
demand for the attorneys’ services of 0,2]0,3%. A 1% increase of income of the
client on the other hand led to an increased use of the attorneys’ services to
0,5]0,6%. In addition the study measured the price elasticity of the increase in the
personal contribution in legal aid cases and found a price elasticity of y0,2%. This
means that when the personal contribution is increased with 1% the use of the
legal aid system will reduce with 0,2%. On the basis of these findings the scholars
also undertook some simulations assuming various policy options to amend the
legal aid system.64 Van Tulder has extended this research later in a 1990 paper65 in
which he, again, showed the relatively low price elasticity. This shows that raising
the personal contribution in the legal aid system provides relatively few possibilities
Ž .to reduce expenditures by reducing demand , given the relatively low revenues
from this personal contribution from the clients. Another problem which Van
Tulder signals in this second paper is that the then existing legal aid system in the
Netherlands provided very few incentives for the producers of legal aid to provide
efficiency. This is due to the fact that the payment to the lawyers involved in the
legal aid system is not dependent upon the result or upon the quality of the
services. As a result Van Tulder showed important differences in the way in which
attorneys dealt with cases in the legal aid system in the various regions. Hence he
argued that the system led to a substantial inequality of the services provided.66
Finally it is interesting to point at a study undertaken by Van Tulder en Spapens
in which they have measured the productivity of the judicial system.67 They
examined the number of court cases compared to the available staff and available
resources. One of their conclusions was that the productivity of the courts de-
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creased over time. They also found that the productivity of larger courts was
slightly better than of smaller courts. Hence, they conclude that not in all cases the
resources available for the judicial system are used in an effective way. This
research led to a critical attack from a socio-legal perspective of Griffiths68 arguing
that one cannot simply measure the productivity of a court system as if it were a
bicycle factory. In his reaction to Griffiths’ criticism Van Tulder argued that either
the production of the court system is driven by external circumstances or can be
influenced by resources. If the first would be the case, than it would also be
immaterial to spend more resources on the court system, if this could anyway not
have a positive impact on the output. If, on the other hand, the production of the
court system can be influenced through additional resources then Van Tulder
signals that the Dutch court system has a serious problem since the available
resources have seriously increased after 1983, whereas the production has seriously
decreased, thus arguing that the effectiveness of the court system in using the
available resources has decreased as well.69
D. Empirical studies on the practice of ci¤il court cases
1. E'olution in the number of cases. When we discussed the issue of the litigation
rate above we already indicated that several legal-sociologists have been interested
Žin the evolution of the number of court cases sometimes also trying to provide an
.explanation for this phenomenon . The Belgian sociologists Langerwerf and Van
Loon examined the evolution in the court cases in Belgium in a large number of
studies. Some of these provide statistical material on the evolution of cases and
caseload per judge; others also analyze the involvement of the various parties and
will be discussed below. A first paper tries to test the hypothesis that the caseload
for courts in the 1970s would have increased spectacularly.70 They found that the
increase of cases in the 1970s depended very much upon the tribunal or court
involved. E.g. for the justices of the peace the increase of cases from 1970 to 1979
Ž .was only 12%, but for the highest court the Cour de Cassation the increase was
264%.71 This evolution has caused serious delays before the various Belgian courts.
For the courts of appeal this led to an increase in delays in handling cases of 342%
in 1979, compared to the situation in 1970. Hence, their research supports the
hypothesis that there has been a ‘‘litigation explosion’’ with the civil courts in
Belgium in the 1970s, leading to serious delays in the handling of cases. The latter
might according to them partially be attributed to the fact that the number of
judges has only been increased with 5% from 1970 to 1979, which is not in
correspondence with the increased number of cases. Hence, they also conclude
that the caseload per judge has increased in the 1970 as well, although there are
considerable differences between the various courts.72 The same scholars have
undertaken a more detailed analysis of the evolution of cases before the tribunal of
first instance of Antwerp between 1970 and 198073 and before some Antwerp
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justices of peace between 1971 and 1984,74 which provide interesting data as well,
which can, however, not be discussed within the scope of this paper.
2. Role of the 'arious parties. Several studies have examined the hypothesis of the
American sociologist Mark Galanter that the so-called one shotters will be rela-
tively less successful in the civil procedure than the repeat players.75 Van Loon,
Langerwerf and Wouters have tested the hypothesis that especially the repeat
players will be well represented by attorneys and that the repeat players would be
more successful in the civil procedure system.76 They found that in most of the
Ž .cases 45% a repeat player is plaintiff and a one-shotter is defendant. The number
of cases of one-shotters against repeat players is, however, increasing in Belgium
Ž .9% in 1970 to 15% in 1984 . These average numbers, however, vary somewhat
when the attention is focused on the various courts. The researchers found a
confirmation of Galanter’s theory on the representation of parties: repeat players
use far more attorneys than one shotters: repeat players only acted without an
attorney in 3% of the cases in 1971, but this had decreased till 1% in 1984. With
the one shotters 15% acted without an attorney.
As far as the success rate was concerned, Galanter’s hypothesis was confirmed as
well: a one shotter has a much higher chance of winning against another one
shotter than against a repeat player. A repeat player on the other hand has a much
better chance of winning against a one shotter than against another repeat player.
The scholars therefore conclude that their empirical findings with respect to the
representation of parties and their success before Belgian civil courts largely
confirm Galanter’s hypothesis.77 This finding was in conformity with previous
research on Belgian courts78 ; it has also been supported by the later studies of
Langerwerf and Van Loon on the cases before the Antwerp tribunal of first
instance and the Antwerp justices of the peace.79
These results, confirming the Galanter hypothesis, have been found for the
Netherlands as well. Jettinghoff examined the money debt collection procedures
before the Rotterdam courts and discovered that 95% of the claims is brought by
repeat players.80 These studies hence all confirm the relative success of the repeat
players. Galanter’s hypothesis on the involvement of Repeat Player’s was also
Ž .examined- and confirmed- for the Dutch Supreme Court Hoge Raad by Bru-
insma.81 This success story is, however, largely undone if it comes to the question
whether the judgements are actually executed as well. Van Koppen and Malsch
examined the question whether winning judgements are actually executed.82 They
found that when it comes to execution the repeat players largely loose against the
one shotter defendant, because they only execute the judgements which convict the
one-shotters to pay in a relatively small number of cases: when it comes to winning
the case before the court, in 73% of the cases plaintiffs seem to win, but little of
that success is left when it comes to the execution phase; then 53% of all
defendants get away without having to pay anything and only 32% of plaintiffs are
able to recover the total amount of the claim. The conclusion of Van Koppen and
Malsch is therefore that in the end the looser wins!
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3. Appeal. The Belgian sociologists Langerwerf and Van Loon have equally exam-
ined the number of appeals against judgements in first instances. In this study they
not only look at the appeal rates, but also at the time it takes to deal with the
Žappeal examining whether the increase in the number of appeals also increases
.the backload . Finally they analyze in the same study as well whether there is a
substantial number of reforms.83 They found that on average the number of
appeals against judgements of justices of the peace in civil cases is relatively low,
although there is an increase from 3,2% in 1965 to 4,8% in 1981. There is,
however, a much higher appeal rate against judgements of justices of the peace in
commercial cases: it increased from 7,3% in 1970 to 17,8% in 1979. The appeal
rates show less differences with respect to the judgements of the tribunal of first
instance: there is a mere increase from 13,6% in 1965 to 17,5% in 1981.84 This
nevertheless shows that the appeal rate against a judgement of the tribunal of first
instance is substantially higher than against the judgements of justices of peace.
Second, the authors also examine the backload of cases with the courts of appeal
between 1975 and 1980. They found that this backload has indeed increased
spectacularly. A record was reached in the courts of appeal in Liege in 1980, where`
parties had to wait on average 10 years before their case could be pleaded before
the courts of appeal.85 Once more the authors also examined Galanter’s hypothesis
on the increased participation of repeat players versus the one shotters.86
More interesting is obviously the final question as to the success rate of the
appellants.87 They found that, although the data are scare and difficult to interpret,
the number of reforms in appeal would only be 23% in the court of appeal of
Antwerp. This corresponds with other research concerning the courts of appeal of
Brussels.88
Ž .4. Summary proceedings. In Dutch civil procedure as in many other legal systems
there is a difference between the ordinary proceedings before civil courts and a
summary proceedings which one can in principle only use for urgent matters. Many
scholars have examined the increasing use of this summary judgement procedure
Ž .the so called kortgeding . Keijser and Tjoen-Tak-Sen established the relative
growth of the number of summary proceedings compared to the average increase
in the litigation rate.89 They found that there was both an increase in the number
of summary proceedings as well as in the number of other civil trials. Nevertheless,
the author concludes that in many cases the parties choose the summary proceed-
ings instead of the ordinary procedure, which would therefore in fact substitute the
ordinary procedure. The summary procedure has also been examined in various
studies of Bruinsma. Bruinsma first of all devoted a study to the use of the
summary proceedings in the district of Amsterdam. He qualified this city as the
‘‘Mekka of the summary proceedings’’ since in 1987 20% of all the summary
proceedings in the Netherlands were held in Amsterdam.90 Based on his empirical
research Bruinsma argued that one cannot generally answer the hypothesis that
the summary proceedings would substitute the ordinary civil procedure. In some
cases there is indeed this substitutive effect, e.g. when money debts are collected in
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a summary proceedings, but in other cases the summary proceedings can more be
considered as accessory to the basic civil procedure. The latter is, according to
Bruinsma e.g. the case in dismissal cases in labour law. Bruinsma also argued that
in the summary proceedings the role of the judge might even be more important
than in the ordinary civil procedures. In a subsequent study Bruinsma looked at the
practice of the summary proceedings in the district of Zwolle.91 He examined both
the number of summary proceedings and the relative success rate of parties.
Bruinsma found a significant higher number of summary proceedings in Amster-
dam than in Zwolle and tries to identify some reasons for this difference. One of
those may be that the backload of cases in Amsterdam is larger than in Zwolle, so
that attorneys in Amsterdam would be more tempted to use the speedy summary
proceedings. The advantage for the parties is that the summary proceedings
provides a decision at relatively low costs within a relatively short time. Bruinsma,
however, warns that there is a danger in this tendency because on the one hand
judges tend to mention that their decision is only preliminary and that they can
merely afford a superficial examination of the case. In practice, however, in 95% of
all cases the decision in the summary proceedings is at the same time the final
decision which, however, lacks the accuracy and full debate which characterises the
ordinary procedure.92
Finally we can point at a paper of Bruinsma of 1994 in which he argues strongly
in favour of the summary proceedings and argues that this should not be any
longer, as is the case today, an exception to the rule, but become an ordinary
separate procedure for specific cases where the conflict is in principle still ‘‘hot’’
and where the conflict can afford a relatively superficial treatment during an oral
procedure which aims at a practical solution for the future.93
E. Role of lawyers
Various studies have also addressed the particular influence of attorneys-at-law on
the civil procedure. Some of the studies relate to the question whether the role of
lawyers increases the litigation rate; others refer specifically to the monopoly
position of attorneys and some try to provide touchstones for measuring the quality
of the services provided by attorneys.
1. More lawyers, more cases? Some have raised the question whether the litigation
rate in society is linked to the number of lawyers. This would enforce the statement
that the demand for legal services is created through the supply and that therefore
more lawyers cause more cases. The economic argument is simply that more
lawyers would lead to a fall in the price of lawyers, which causes the demand for
the services of lawyers to increase.94 Langerwerf and Van Loon showed that
between 1970 and 1983 in Belgium the number of attorneys increased.95 At the
same time the number of cases increased as well. It is, however, only possible to
raise the question whether there is a causal-link between the two events, but it is
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impossible to answer it.96 Bruinsma equally suggested that the increased litigation
rate in the Netherlands is due to a doubling of the number of attorneys during the
last 10 years.97
The question has also been examined empirically by Langerwerf who examined
what the cause was for increased litigation rates before the civil courts in Belgium
between 1950 and 1980.98 Langerwerf found a clear relationship between on the
one hand social-economic variables and on the other hand the litigation rate, but
also clearly found that there is only an insignificant relationship between the
number of attorneys and the litigation rate. This Belgian empirical research
therefore does not provide any support for the statement that supply would create
demand.
2. The monopoly position of attorneys. Many studies have addressed the effects of
the monopoly position of attorneys in the civil procedure. Most of this literature
fits into the broader framework of studies which have addressed either the
regulation of the retailing trade99 or the regulation of professions in general.100
The crucial question in most of these studies is whether the professional ethics and
the self regulatory schemes can be considered as effective remedies to cure an
informational asymmetry or should be seen as devices of rent seeking by profes-
sionals. Faure and Van den Bergh empirically examined the validity of the public
interest arguments in favour of the self-regulatory regime of attorneys in Belgium.
One of the arguments holds that the professions themselves have better knowledge
to regulate quality. However, an analysis of the disciplinary cases handled by the
Antwerp bar between 1984 and 1986 showed that the self-regulatory rules are
rarely used to assure minimum quality through sanctions for malpractice, but are
mostly concerned with restricting competitive behaviour by professionals. The
professional body of attorneys seems indeed not so much concerned with the
supervision of the quality of services, but rather with the public image of
attorneys.101 A later study by Faure concerning the disciplinary cases handled by
the ‘‘Ordre des Avocats’’ of the district of Turnhout between 1980 and 1985
confirmed this picture.102
Faure and Van den Bergh argued that most of the rules providing monopoly
powers to attorneys can be explained as the result of rent seeking by the profes-
sional bodies. One explanation for the influence of attorneys on the civil procedure
is their relative importance in the legislative process.103 One would obviously
expect that the result of the lobbying is a transfer of wealth to the attorneys as a
result of the monopoly position. Faure and Van den Bergh have provided an
overview of the average income of the various professions compared to the income
of self employed workers in Belgium, which provides some circumstantial evidence
of a relationship between the degree of regulation and the income of the various
professions.104 Although the average attorney in Belgium earns indeed more than
the average self-employed worker, the total amount of the rents of attorneys is
rather disappointing. The explanation seems to be that there are substantial
intra-professional transfers from the younger professionals to the older ones.
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Indeed: only the younger professionals have to perform the pro bono cases and
have difficulties establishing their own clientele through a prohibition of advertis-
ing. Langerwerf and Van Loon found that the average monthly income of the
young attorneys in the training period was about 5,000 Belgian francs in 1984.105 If
one notices that in the same period the average income of all attorneys was
approximately 700,000 Belgian francs one understands that the most significant
effect of self-regulation is an intra professional transfer to a limited group of
practitioners.106
ŽThe monopoly position of various legal professions bailiffs, notary publics and
.attorneys is also addressed for the Netherlands in a study by Bruinsma who
equally argues that the rentseeking leads to too high prices to be paid for legal
services. Bruinsma backs up this statement with a reference to the revenues of the
various legal professions in 1994.107 An interest-group analysis by Hellingman
provides evidence for rent-seeking behaviour by attorneys in the Netherlands,108
just as this was described above for Belgium. Bruinsma and Huls also revealed
some remarkable concerted practices between the mega lawfirms to restrict com-
petition.109
3. Quality of ser'ices performed. Some studies also address the question of the
quality of services performed by attorneys during the civil procedure by comparing
the success rate of clients represented by attorneys with clients who are not
represented by attorneys. In one of the many studies of Langerwerf and Van Loon
also the success rate of attorneys is addressed. They found that clients who act as
plaintiff in money-debt collecting cases before the justices of the peace in Antwerp
have a better success score if they are represented by an attorney than if they are
not.110 However, the number of cases without representation by an attorney was
Ž .small, but for all the examined years 1971]1984 plaintiffs did better with than
without an attorney. Attorneys, however, do not necessarily better if their success
rate is compared with the rates of other professionals who can plead as well. This is
e.g. the case in Belgium before the labour courts, where representatives of the
trade unions are allowed to plead. Empirical research by Keijers and Peeters
showed that the representatives of the trade unions were relatively more successful
than the average attorney.111
The quality of the services provided by lawyers has also been examined in
various studies which address the possibility of attorneys to predict the outcome of
their cases. A well-known Dutch study in this respect is the dissertation by Malsch
on lawyers’ predictions of judicial decisions.112 This study examines the possibilities
for lawyers to predict the outcome of the criminal cases they will plead. She
concludes, interestingly enough, that lawyers do not do any better than laymen as
far as the simple question concerning success or not is concerned. When it comes
Ž .to more refined questions e.g. predicting the length of the present sanction
lawyers, however, do better than laymen.113 In addition Malsch found that attor-
Žneys generally overestimate their chances by 8% which is obviously a relatively low
.number , whereby specialised attorneys do better in predicting outcomes than
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non-specialised. Experience, measured by the number of years of practice, how-
ever, does not seem to influence the possibility to provide an adequate prediction
of the outcome.114
The predictability of the outcome of various cases has also been addressed in an
experiment concerning summary judgements that was undertaken by Bruinsma.
His conclusions are in line with the findings of Malsch: lawyers do not do
substantially better in predicting the outcome of summary cases than laymen.115
F. Results
Many studies in Belgium and in the Netherlands have dealt with the working of the
legal system. Most of these studies, however, do not provide an explicit empirical
testing of the effects of legal rules on allocational outcomes. They are more
concerned with the effects of changes in the decision-making environment on
rational actions in the legal system. As such, these findings are interesting as well,
even though they do not always explicitly test hypotheses from the law and
economics literature. In some cases, the empirical findings discussed are not
presented as a test of specific theoretical literature; in other cases, they provide
some indication for the significance of earlier theoretical analyses. In general, the
BelgianrDutch empirical research seems to provide}again}support for the
hypotheses of the socio-economic literature, although there are some nuances as
well. E.g., as far as the PriestrKlein selection hypothesis is concerned, a Dutch
study confirms that the decision to litigate will mostly be influenced by the
subjective perception of the chance of winning. Precisely because of differences in
these subjective perceptions it will not always be the 50-50% cases which will go to
Ž .trial as was proposed by PriestrKlein .
Comparisons between the Netherlands and Germany showed that the decision to
litigate might also be influenced by other variables than the ones indicated in the
theoretical literature on the selection bias. Several Dutch studies indicate a general
higher civil litigation rate in Germany than in the Netherlands, which can hardly be
explained on the basis of the theoretical literature.
One particular hypothesis from the socio-legal literature, more particularly
Galanter’s story that one shotters will be relatively less successful in the civil
procedure than repeat players certainly received confirmation both from Belgian
and Dutch empirical studies. Repeat players seem to more often hire an attorney
and have generally a higher chance of winning. Interestingly enough though, these
repeat players apparently less insist on the execution of a judgement, so that in the
execution phase the one shotter defendant seems to be more successful. Also the
Ž .relatively low reversal of decisions on appeal about 23% in Belgium might be
seen as a confirmation of Shavell’s hypothesis that the appeals process can be
considered as a means of error correction.116
Rather interesting are the BelgianrDutch empirical studies with respect to the
role of lawyers. Remarkably, the economic argument that more lawyers would lead
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to a higher demand for the services of lawyers and hence to more cases,117 does not
seem to be supported by a Belgian empirical study. The litigation rate was
according to this study influenced by a number of variables, except the number of
lawyers. Many studies have also dealt with the monopoly position of attorneys in
the civil procedure. The traditional theoretical argument in favour of a regulation
of the quality of attorneys would be Akerlof’s hypothesis concerning the informa-
tional asymmetry between the client and the attorney.118 Belgian studies indicate
that the professional bodies do not seem to be very much concerned with the
supervision of the quality of services, but rather with restrictions of competition.
However, the success rate of attorneys, compared to cases where clients are not
represented, seems to be positive. A Dutch study, on the other hand, indicated that
lawyers do not do very well as far as the prediction of the outcome of cases is
concerned. The studies seem to provide more support for the hypothesis that
professional regulation aims primarily at restricting entry, limiting competition and
thus at rent seeking.119 But, although attorneys in Belgium and the Netherlands
seem to have been successful in obtaining a major role in the civil process, the
amounts of the rents they obtained is rather disappointing. Belgian studies indicate
that substantial intraprofessional transfers take place from young professionals to
the older ones, so that the regulations probably benefit specific groups within the
profession.
IV. Liability and insurance
In this part of the paper I will finally discuss some of the research which has been
done in Belgium and the Netherlands and in which some attention is paid to the
possible effects of liability rules and insurance schemes on the behaviour of people.
Some of these studies give qualitative evidence of the fact that judges take into
account economic arguments e.g. in fixing the required care in a tort case; other
studies at best provide some statistical evidence on evolutions in accidental rates or
on administrative costs of various systems, but most of these studies provide
information which is at best speculative. Unfortunately, none of these studies
provides truly empirical evidence of the working of liability rules and insurance. I
Ž . Ž .will first address liability rules A and then turn to insurance B .
A. Liability
1. Do liability rules deter? The whole economic analysis of tort law120 claims that
tort law will have a preventive effect. The simple reasoning is that the ex ante
foresight of possibly being held liable ex post will induce the injurer today to
careful behaviour. Economists therefore claim that prevention of accidents should
be the main goal of tort law, whereas lawyers traditionally deny that tort law has a
deterrent function or only recognise}at best as}a side effect. Unfortunately
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Ž .there is very little in fact none at all empirical evidence of the preventive effect of
tort rules in Belgium and the Netherlands.121 The consequence of this lack of
empirical research is that it obviously weakens the impact of economic analysis in
recent debates on the reform of tort law. Some lawyers use statistical data on e.g.
the fact that the accident rate has not increased after the introduction of compul-
sory insurance to argue that liability rules therefore barely had a preventive
effect.122 These arguments were rightly countered by law and economics scholars
such as Van den Bergh who correctly argued that this statistical decrease after the
introduction of compulsory insurance provides no information at all on the
preventive effect of tort rules if other factors that could have contributed to such a
123 Ždecrease are not taken into account as well. Other lawyers argue but also
.without empirical support that the preventive effect of tort rules is at least ‘‘a not
undesirable side-effect’’ of liability.124
There are, however, a couple of studies which have addressed certain effects of
accident law, but rarely the preventive effect. Those studies are generally inter-
ested in the question whether tort law is adequately able to provide compensation
for victims of accidents and in the administrative costs of the system. In law and
economics terms one could, following Calabresi,125 say that they do not address the
primary accident costs, but mostly the secondary and tertiary.
In the Netherlands during the seventies some quantitative research has been
done into the practical effects of traffic liability. Most of this research is concerned
with traffic accidents. One study analyses the settlement of traffic liability cases
from the position of the judge. It analyzes all the judgements which have been
ruled with respect to traffic liability in the Netherlands in 1967 and 1968.126 The
second study concentrated on the position of the victim and was based on a
random questioning of all male victims of traffic accidents in the age between 16
and 64 in the years 1967 and 1968.127 The third study focused on the traffic
accident from the perspective of an insurer and contained 196 case studies on the
way in which three major insurance companies dealt with the handling of traffic
accidents.128 An excellent summary of these three studies will recently be provided
in the doctoral dissertation of Van Dam.129
The first study, more focusing on the position of the judge, found that in 79% of
the cases in which there was a traffic accident procedure, the negligence of the
defendant was disputed, whereas only in 25% of cases disputes concerned the
magnitude of the damage. The authors use this as an argument that most court
cases merely deal with discussions concerning negligence. In the second research,
focusing more on the position of the victim, the authors claimed that less than full
compensation was awarded to the victims and that the legal procedures to come to
compensation would be too long. They also claim that the role of tort law in
compensating victims of traffic accidents would be relatively low. Tort law would,
Ž .compared to other mostly social security and first party insurance sources only
contribute to 10% of the total compensation of traffic accident losses.130 The third
study focuses on the position of the liability insurer. The authors claim that in
many cases the issue of negligence of the insured injurer is mostly the most
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important point to deter mine before an insurer is willing to settle. In 71% of the
135 cases, negligence could be established without any problem; in only 10% of the
cases, there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim.131
There has been a relatively widely debate on the potentially deterring effects of
liability rules in the Netherlands, following a recent proposal to introduce a strict
liability regime for traffic accidents, according to which the driver of a car would be
strictly liable for damage to passengers and non-motorised third parties, unless
there would be an intentional fault or conscious recklessness on the part of the
victim. This proposal follows the French ‘‘loi Badinter’’ which introduced strict
traffic liability towards non-motorised victims unless there is an inexcusable fault
Ž .‘‘faute inexcusable’’ on the side of the victim. Belgium recently introduced a
similar regime as France, although the legal technique is somewhat different.
These legislative changes and proposals have of course given rise to some debate
between traditional lawyers and law and economics scholars whereby, roughly
speaking, law and economics scholars predict that strict liability regimes without a
serious contributory negligence defence on the part of the victim will lead too low
care on the side of the victim and hence, to too many accidents.132 Lawyers on the
other hand argue that both drivers and pedestrians will be careful anyway,
irrespective of the applicable tort regime. Although none of these arguments is,
unfortunately, supported by serious empirical research, it is nevertheless useful to
look at some of the arguments advanced in that debate. The well-known French
tort scholar Andre Tunc has claimed that after the introduction of the French loi´
Badinter the number of traffic accidents has not increased, nor have the premiums
for third party traffic liability.133 This empirical statement is, however, severely
criticised by Roger Van den Bergh. If no other factors are indicated which might
have an influence on the accident rate or the level of premiums it is of course
impossible to argue that the shift to a strict liability regime with an almost no fault
regime as far as the victim’s behaviour is concerned would not lead to an increase
in the accident risk. Van den Bergh claims that French case law which guarantees
full compensation to victims even if they have neglected the most obvious rules of
the traffic code or even if they would present themselves drunken on the road,
does create several inefficiencies.13 4 For the same reason Van den Bergh is also
very critical with respect to the Belgian traffic liability system since it, as in France,
provides an almost automatic compensation to the victim, irrespective of their
behaviour.135 He claims that the German system, whereby victims still have to bear
a part of the compensation themselves in case of negligence, better complies with
the economic model136 but unfortunately these statements are not backed up by
empirical evidence either. However, Van den Bergh rightly indicates that the
Žrelative decrease of the number of traffic victims in recent years at which Tunc
.proudly points is obviously not necessarily related to the change in a traffic
liability system. A decrease of the number of fatal accidents since 1950 seems to be
a general trend in industrial countries. Hence, one cannot a priori exclude the
possibility that changes in the liability system have slowed down this tendency to a
decrease in the number of traffic accidents.137 Furthermore Van den Bergh refers
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to the well-known North-American studies on effects of no fault liability systems to
claim that those systems would have lead to an increase in the number of traffic
accidents.138 In sum, although there is some interesting literature with respect to
recent changes in the traffic liability regime in Belgium, the Netherlands, France
and Germany, there is little or no empirical evidence with respect to the effect of
these changes on the accident rate.
Ž .2. Administrati'e costs. Some Dutch opponents of the liability system have argued
that the costs of the liability system would be huge, especially compared to other
compensation mechanisms. Especially the Dutch studies, referred to above, argue
that liability rules are a costly way of shifting losses from the injurer to the
victim.139 This claim is especially backed up with some modest statistical evidence
in relation to the exercise of a right of recourse by first party insurers. The
researchers claimed that in 57% of all the examined traffic liability cases the
plaintiff was a first party insurer.140 Hence, they argued that many of the adminis-
trative costs related to traffic accident procedures are caused by the right of
redress exercised by first party insurers. Moreover, 77% of all the recourse claims
would relate to claims with a value of less than Dfl. 3.000. Hence, they claim that
an abrogation of the right of redress of social and first party insurers would lead to
half the number of court procedures with respect to traffic accidents today.141
These numbers on the relative high administrative costs related to the recourse
procedures may well be correct, but provide in fact very little information on the
effectiveness of the liability system. The researchers indeed totally neglect the fact
that some of these recourse actions may well have a positive effect on the
incentives of injurers to prevent accidents. Nevertheless, these types of figures are
often important in the debate concerning the reform of traffic liability. During the
discussion concerning the reform of traffic liability in the Netherlands, it was
claimed that of all the money paid by third party traffic liability insurers 40%
would be paid to first party insurers in recourse actions and only 60% to the
victims.142
Some more details can be given concerning these costs of recourse actions.
Bloembergen claimed in 1973 that 1r3 of all the funds paid by third party traffic
liability insurers for personal injury would be paid to first party insurers.143 In 1980
he claimed that 2r3 of all the money paid by traffic liability insurers would be paid
to social insurers as a result of recourse actions.144 Traffic liability insurers today
claim that half of the total amounts paid for personal injury are paid to first party
insurers in recourse actions.145 In 1993 traffic liability insurers paid about 1 billion
Dutch guilders; of this amount therefore 500 million was paid to first party
insurers.146
We should also point at a recent study by Weterings on the transaction costs in
the compensation of personal injury.147 He estimated the transaction costs involved
in establishing medical causation, in establishing liability and in establishing the
amount of damages and estimated that the administrative costs in the three phases
are about the same. These findings are, however, based on estimates as a result of
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the claim settlement practice in personal injury cases rather than on hand empiri-
cal data.
3. Cost benefit analysis in establishing the due care standard. One of the claims of the
early studies concerning the economics of accident law has always been that judges
in fixing the level of prevention required from parties in a potential accident
setting would implicitly weigh the marginal costs of accident prevention versus the
marginal benefits in a further reduction of the accident costs.148 ‘‘Empirical’’
support for this statement was always presented by referring to the famous
American Learned Hand Case149 in which it was claimed that the injurer should
only be held liable if the burden of precaution was lower than the probability that
an accident would occur multiplied by the magnitude of the loss.150 Of course,
Belgian and Dutch scholars have also tried to look for similar cases in their
jurisdictions to show ‘‘empirically’’ that judges indeed behave as economic theory
predicts.151 Faure and Van den Bergh examined Belgian liability law and found a
number of cases which could be interpreted as applications of the incremental
learned hand standard.152 Similar cases can also be found in the Netherlands. In
one case, which is well known among law and economics scholars the Dutch
Supreme Court argued that in establishing liability the judge has to take into
account the probability that not taking certain preventive measures will lead to an
accident, taking into account the potential magnitude of the damage and also the
costs of preventive measures.153 This reasoning seems to fit very well in the
economic model. Similar examples of cost benefit weighing in liability law can also
be found in German liability law.154
B. Insurance
1. Expanding liability. Insurers and enterprises generally become extremely wor-
ried in Belgium and especially in the Netherlands as a result of a seemingly
expanding scope of enterprise liability. This has brought about the question for
insurance companies whether it would be possible to analyze the scope of liability
of industrial operators and their insurers and more particularly the factors which
have a bearing upon this scope of liability. A study which was commissioned by the
Dutch insurance industry analysed some of these factors influencing the scope of
liability.155 Obviously the mere fact that claims may rise or not provides as such
very little evidence of the efficiency of such an expanding enterprise liability, but it
may nevertheless be useful to show what type of factors are taken into account
when the scope of liability is to be determined.156 The claim is made that in
western Europe victims could to a large extent rely upon elaborated first party
insurance systems, so that victims individually only had incentives to sue an injurer
in tort for the part of the damage that was not taken care of via the first party
insurance scheme. This has, however, changed in recent years. In the Netherlands
changes have taken place in the Dutch social security system, which can be
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considered as external factors that force victims to make an increased use of
possibilities already available within the tort system. There seems to be some
empirical support for the claim that the tort system will be used more heavily by
victims when they need to do so because of a withdrawing government in the social
security sphere.157
The likelihood that a lawsuit in tort will be brought against an industrial
operator may well depend upon factors outside of tort law, such as the vague
notion ‘‘willingness to claim.’’158 In that respect an interesting study has been
published by Verkruisen, a sociologist who examined the number of ‘‘avoidable
fatal accidents as a result of medical treatment.’’ He claims that about 3.000
persons die every year in the Netherlands as a result of avoidable medical
malpractice.159 In addition there would be 25.000 cases of personal injury. Never-
theless only about 100 claims were brought in 1992, which, according to Verkruisen
therefore only represent the ‘‘Top of the Iceberg.’’ Although he does not argue
that all of these avoidable medical malpractice cases could give rise to liability,
there is undoubtedly a serious risk that this huge amount of latent claims could be
brought at some stage when the public awareness of medical malpractice in the
Netherlands will increase.160
It is furthermore interesting to point at some of the quantitative evidence
resulting from this study on the expanding scope of enterprise liability. Van Mierlo
used German and Belgian data161 and transformed these to the Dutch demo-
graphic situation. He found that, based on the number of occupational diseases
between 1990 and 1993 the total costs of occupational diseases would increase
from 58 million Dutch guilders in 1990 to 259 million Dutch guilders in 2005. This
prognoses was based on an extrapolation based on a minimum scenario, assuming
that no structural changes take place which increase the scope of liability substan-
Žtially. If such structural changes are assumed e.g. a further withdrawing of the
.government from social security the total costs of occupational diseases may,
according to this study, even rise up to 518 million Dutch guilders in 2005.162 This
study obviously only relies on four reference years and is further based on
prognoses, which were largely used by the Dutch insurers as an argument to
change the system of coverage.163
Hard evidence concerning a real increase in the number of liability cases is,
however, missing. The Dutch association of insurers itself published statistics which
showed an increase in the total amount of damage paid on general liability for
enterprises from 319 million Dutch guilders in 1988 up to 478 million Dutch
guilders in 1993.164 However, this increase seems to have been caused mainly by an
increase in the average amount of damages on every claim which increased from an
average 100 in 1988 to 141 in 1993. There is, however, less evidence that also the
actual number of claims has indeed increased between 1988 and 1993. So far these
numbers only showed that the amount of damages paid per claim increased, but
not the amount of claims. The data are confirmed in a study by Haazen and
Spier165: between 1989 and 1994 the claim frequency decreased with 17%, but the
average amount paid per claim increased with 58%!
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Obviously there is lot of intuitive statistical material available of the newspaper
type where scholars claim e.g. that 30.000 new victims of asbestos will be discovered
in the Netherlands in the coming 10 years.166 If this is multiplied with an average
amount in immaterial loss of 100.000 Dutch guilders which is paid to victims of
Ž .asbestos or their heirs , one can make the claim that the asbestos crisis will cost at
least 30.000 = 100.000 s 3 billion Dutch guilders in the coming years in the
Netherlands.167 These types of calculations are undoubtedly popular with insur-
ance companies that wish to justify a premium increase, but are obviously less
useful from an academic point of view. This led recently attorney-general Jaap
Spier, one of the most prestigious tort lawyers in the Netherlands, to argue that the
cries of insurance companies concerning an insurability crisis totally lack any
empirical support.168
2. Effecti'eness of risk differentiation through a bonus-malus system. In the law and
economics literature it has been claimed that ex post monitoring systems such as
experience rating may well constitute an effective remedy against moral hazard.169
Economists look with great interest at these so-called bonus-malus regimes since
these systems of risk differentiation could, when applied effectively, replace the
deterrent effects of tort law. However, a bonus-malus regime usually only has very
general categories and hardly ever allows for a detailed risk differentiation.
There is some modest empirical evidence with respect to the effectiveness of
those bonus-malus systems in controlling the accident risks in traffic. A thorough
study of the various bonus-malus systems in Europe has been conducted by
Lemaire.170 Lemaire shows with empirical support that in those countries where
there is no intervention of the regulator in the bonus-malus system and a large
variety of steps can be allowed, an optimal risk differentiation can be achieved.
Lemaire makes comparisons between the bonus-malus systems in France, Belgium
and the Netherlands, with respect to the question which systems corresponds
optimally with the requirement of risk differentiation at low costs. However,
Lemaire’s research does not link the differences in bonus-malus systems with the
accident rates, so that no empirical evidence is available on the effectiveness of a
Ž .particular bonus-malus system. There is some modest empirical evidence pro-
vided by the Belgian insurer ABB with respect to the effectiveness of a bonus-malus
system in the prevention of accident risks. This Belgian insurer claims that for
insured trucks on which a bonus-malus system is applied, the number of accidents
is considerably lower than when no bonus-malus system is applied.171 ABB does,
however, not make clear what the source for their data is. A different result was
however obtained recently by a Dutch research performed for the Dutch insurer’
association.172 The study made a comparison between two groups of insured: one
group which was insured according to a bonus-malus system and the other one
which was not insured under bonus-malus. A striking conclusion of this research
was that a bonus-malus regime does not lead to less reported claims or to less
damage in general. This Dutch report therefore cannot provide support for the
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argument that a bonus-malus system would have a positive effect on the accident
rate.
3. Towards first party insurance? One aspect of the expanding third party liability,
which was discussed above, is that American law and economics scholars have
predicted that an effective remedy for expanding enterprise liability would be a
shift to first party insurance. Especially Priest has powerfully argued that first party
insurance would better enable an effective risk monitoring by insurance companies.
Thus, they could better differentiate risks and fight the adverse selection problem.173
There was already a widespread use of first party insurance in the Netherlands,174
but its use is increasing today. One could argue that there is some empirical
evidence that a move towards first party insurance would be the appropriate
remedy for expanding third party liability, since this is particularly what is happen-
ing in the Netherlands today. The least one could argue is that apparently Dutch
insurers have listened to Priest’s warnings. Indeed: in the area of environ mental
liability Dutch insurers have withdrawn all together from the market as far as third
party liability insurance is concerned and have instead offered coverage for soil
pollution on a first party basis. A same proposal has been launched in the
Netherlands as far as employers’ liability for occupational diseases is concerned.175
Finally one could also point that the fact that within the whole discussion on the
Žreform of traffic liability in the Netherlands, some law and economics scholars and
.176some lawyers have equally argued that if the policy makers apparently do not
believe in the preventive effect of traffic liability, a first party traffic insurance
might well provide compensation to victims at lower costs than the current liability
system.177 These recent developments in the Netherlands correspond with the
argument made in the literature that first party insurance might be an appropriate
response to remedy an expanding third party enterprise liability.
C. Results
The rich empirical literature on crime and civil procedure seems to be in sharp
contrast with the modest empirical findings concerning liability and insurance.
Apparently the hypotheses which come most directly from the law and economics
literature have not been subjected to much empirical analysis. This is e.g. the case
for the general assumption in the economic analysis of accident law that potential
parties to an accident setting would adapt their behaviour to the liability and
insurance schemes in place. There is hardly any hard empirical evidence on a
deterrent effect of tort law; the best ‘‘evidence’’ in Belgium and the Netherlands is
merely anecdotal. There are Dutch studies which have focused on the relatively
high administrative costs of the liability system and its relative ineffectiveness in
compensating accident victims. Some Dutch research e.g. concerning the exercise
of a right of recourse suggest that the recourse would only lead to an inefficient
transfer of funds with high administrative costs. However, these studies only point
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Ž .at high tertiary costs in Calabresi terms but provide no information on the
Ž .potentially beneficial effects of recourse or liability actions on the reduction of
primary accident costs.
Although the empirical results concerning the functioning of liability rules are
disappointing, there is some empirical evidence on the increasing use of the
liability system. Dutch data on an increasing number of claims provide some
support for the statement of George Priest that pressures on the liability system
will especially become high if tort law is used as a system to cover primary needs of
victims. Priest’ claim that the increasing use of the liability system would lead to an
increasing call for first-party insurance seems to be supported by Dutch evidence
where first party insurance is indeed advanced as a remedy for a ‘‘Dutch liability
crisis.’’
V. Concluding remarks
In this paper I attempted to provide some insight in the empirical socio-economic
research which has been undertaken in Belgium and in the Netherlands with
respect to the functioning of legal rules and institutions. Given the limits of this
paper I focussed on the results of a few specific legal domains, criminal law, civil
procedure, liability and insurance. The results of the overview with respect to these
specific domains is interesting, not so much for the specific outcome, but because
this overview tells us something about what we have actually been able to establish
empirically as far as the effectiveness of legal rules and institutions is concerned.
Two general points can be mentioned in this respect: first, the results are
somewhat disappointing as far as liability and insurance is concerned, more
promising as the domain of criminal law is concerned and apparently overwhelming
in the area of civil procedure. This is striking since e.g. with respect to liability and
insurance a rich theoretical literature exists which is based on various assumptions,
e.g. related to the preventive effect of liability rules which is, however, not backed
up by empirical research, at least in Belgium or the Netherlands. This result is
obviously of interest for the determination of the future research agenda and
would indicate that a shift from theoretical to empirical studies seems warranted.
Second, there seem to be important differences in focus between the law and
economics studies on the one hand and the socio-legal studies on the other hand.
Belgian and Dutch law and economics scholars seem to have paid a lot of attention
Žto the area of liability and insurance although very few attention to empirical
.research . This area is less discussed in the socio-legal literature, although there
are some papers dealing with the question how the law should allocate risks in
society. The domain of crime and punishment seems to have received attention
both from economists as well as from sociologists. Dutch and Belgian sociologists
have clearly dominated the empirical research with respect to the area of civil
procedure.
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Moreover, the empirical work discussed in this paper deals with different issues.
Only the}modest}work on liability and insurance seems to address the alloca-
Žtional effects of legal rules themselves by addressing issues such as whether
compensation of injured parties will be achieved through liability based on fault or
.through insurance schemes without regard to fault . The overview showed that
there seems to be very little in the way of reliable empirical testing of hypotheses
emanating from the law and economics literature. The sections on crime and civil
procedure discuss a more satisfying body of empirical research, but their focus is
not on the effects of legal rules as such; instead this research is concerned with
related issues such as the influence of the number of lawyers in a legal system on
the number of cases litigated. This empirical work tests hypotheses of the sort
advanced by economists, but not specifically the hypotheses formulated by law and
economics scholars. The paradoxical result is hence that those hypotheses that
come most directly from the law and economics literature have not been subjected
to much empirical analysis at all, while those that only indirectly relate to law and
economics have been the focus of the bulk of empirical research.
Turning to some specific results, we can point at a few interesting results which
have been obtained in Belgium and the Netherlands to support economic theories
of crime and punishment. Some studies provide support for the Becker hypothesis
that crime could be deterred by increasing the probability of detection or the
expected sanction, but the few available studies in that respect are not overwhelm-
ingly convincing. Many of the sociological studies dealing with crime had more
Žattention for the criminogenic determinants what makes people decide to engage
.in criminal activities instead of focussing on the effects of legal rules and
institutions on criminal behaviour. Some economists have provided empirical
research to back up Stigler’s hypothesis on the optimal allocation of resources to
crime control.
Many socio-legal studies in Belgium and the Netherlands have focused on civil
procedure, trying to explain the selection of cased for trial, litigation rates, the
evolution in the number of cases and the role of the various parties in the civil
procedure. Very little support is provided for the PriestrKlein hypothesis that only
the fifty-fifty cases would go to trial, but overwhelming support is provided both in
Belgium as well as in the Netherlands for Galanter’s hypothesis on the relative
success of repeat players versus one shotters in the civil procedure. Moreover,
various studies, e.g. with respect to money debt collection have shown how parties
assess the choice between judicial versus non-judicial claims handling, based on
costs and benefits of the two alternatives. Finally Belgian and Dutch studies
provided support for the hypothesis of public choice scholars that attorneys will act
as a pressure group trying to obtain rents e.g. by acquiring specific monopoly rights.
Most of this empirical research dealing with the civil procedure was provided by
socio-legal scholars. In general, apparently most of the empirical studies discussed
in this paper have been provided by sociologists rather than by lawyers or
economists. With the exception of Van Tulder very few law and economics scholars
have apparently engaged in empirical studies in Belgium or the Netherlands with
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respect to the domains discussed in this paper. This relative success of sociologists
may be due to the fact that there is a long tradition of sociology of law in Belgium
and the Netherlands. Chairs in these domains have been established mostly more
than 25 years ago at the various Dutch and Belgian universities. Law and eco-
Ž .nomics is a much younger discipline; only in the Netherlands part time chairs
were established in that domain in the last 5 years. This explains why Bruinsma
could write in the Nederlands Juristenblad in an overview of sociology of law in the
Netherlands in 1993 that ‘‘sociology of law is not new any longer and new fashions
present itself, such as law and economics for the ‘hard boiled’ among us, but
sociology of law is and remains however the most complete empirical study of the
current legal system. Law and economics reduces reality to a model with quantita-
tive data.’’178 This statement provides obviously an interesting challenge for law
and economics scholars: let us see after 20 years, when law and economics in
Belgium and the Netherlands has had a similar investment as sociology of law had
until now whether law and economics can provide empirical support for the rich
theoretical literature it has developed so far.
We already pointed at the striking difference between the rich theoretical
literature on liability and insurance, compared to the modest empirical results. In
fact, no studies are available to back up the claim in the law and economics
literature that liability rules would have a preventive effect; there is only some
evidence that further risk differentiation in insurance would reduce the accident
risk. Nevertheless there are some, although not quantitative, studies which show
that judges e.g. in establishing the due care standard follow the assumptions of the
economic models. In some cases one even has the impression that data are
misleadingly represented to achieve specific policy results. One can point at the
repeated claim that no fault accident schemes in traffic liability would not lead to a
higher accident rate or to the claim that the exercise of the right of redress by third
Žparty liability insurers would merely lead to excessive costs thereby neglecting the
.potential benefits in increased prevention . Also insurers tend to use data e.g. to
argue that accident risks would have increased in recent years in the Netherlands,
whereas it is in fact merely the average amount of damage per claim which
increased, not the number of claims itself. Some scholars have therefore correctly
argued that insurers should better cooperate in providing reliable data to aca-
demics instead of merely providing a few selective data to justify policy changes
such as a premium increase.
The fact that so little reliable data on the effects of liability and insurance are
available is of course the major explanation for the lack of adequate empirical
research in this area in Belgium and the Netherlands. Testing the hypothesis that
liability rules would deter accidents is in itself difficult, given the existence of
insurance coverage. Therefore academics are dependent upon insurers to provide
data to test how the behaviour of parties in an accident setting may change under
different insurance schemes. Still the difference between the overwhelming theo-
retical literature on liability and insurance and the little empirical research
available remains striking. This finding most certainly backs up a call for a drastic
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change in Belgium and the Netherlands from theoretical towards more empirically
oriented research. Indeed, the general conclusion of the empirical studies dis-
cussed seems to be that while the empirical literature on the effect of changes in
the decision making environment on rational actions in the legal system is rich and
provocative, there is much less empirical testing of the effects of legal rules as such
on allocational outcomes. More effort should therefore be devoted to this latter
issue.
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